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THE SUPREME COURT, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND COMMON LAW RULES
In the recent decision in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee
Flour Mills Co.,' the Supreme Court seems to me to have en-
tirely forgotten, or to have ignored its own decision rendered
only a few years before, after due deliberation. The circum-
stance is the more remarkable, in that in both instances the same
judge delivered the opinions of the court.
The question involved related to a subject that is perhaps not
yet entirely free from obscurity, the effect of the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution with reference to the applica-
tion of merely common law rules. Now it is established that the
existence of the power of Congress under such provision, pre-
cludes to an extent at least, even in the absence of exercise of
such power, the exercise of any power of regulation under the
authority of State legislation.2 But does the existence of such
power in Congress likewise preclude the application (whether
in the Federal or the State courts) of merely common law rules,
to commerce within the scope of the commerce clause? To illus-
trate: Suppose a rule regulating the liability of a carrier in case
of loss to be based on a State statute merely, and on that account
inapplicable to commerce within the scope of the commerce
clause. 3 Suppose, however, such rule of liability to be purely a
common law rule, is it not applicable to such commerce even if
sought to be enforced in a State court? The artificiality of such
distinction, if it exists, seems to me apparent from a considera-
tion of what would be the effect of a statute merely declaratory
of the common law. Regarding the rule declared as merely
statutory, it would seem inapplicable to commerce within the
scope of the commerce clause; regarding it as a common law
rule, it would be applicable.4 Yet in both instances the practical
effect seems precisely the same.
1211 U. S., 612 (igog).
2 Of the numerous decisions in point, see for instance, Bowman v.
Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U. S., 465, 481 (1888).
3 See for instance, Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Markley, I9o6 U. S.,
194 (,9o5).
4 That it would be given the same effect, may be suggested by Tele-
graph Co. v. Mellon, ioo Tenn., 429 (i898).
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It is, indeed, the artificiality of this distinction that seems to me
to furnish support to the view that it is an erroneous construction
of the commerce clause, that the power to regulate conferred
upon Congress thereby is, in any case, that is to say, in the
absence of exercise thereof, exclusive of exercise of the power of
regulation under the authority of a State. I submit that this is
unjustifiable according to established rules of construction. In
this view, the power of Congress is merely concurrent, there be-
ing reserved to the States the power to regulate in any case other-
wise within their jurisdiction, so that to such commerce may be
applied indifferently rules based on State legislation and common
law rules. But I forbear to further discuss what seems to be a
purely academic point.
The existence of the distinction in question seems to have been
established in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co.,5
where a State court was held to have acted rightly in allowing
relief on account of discrimination in commerce within the scope
of the commerce clause, that is to say, in charges for telegraphic
messages sent between points in different States. It was said
by Brewer, J., delivering the opinion of a unanimous court:
"Can it be that the great multitude of interstate commercial
transactions are freed from the burdens created by the common
law, . . . and are subject to no rule except that to be found
in the statutes of Congress? We are clearly of opinion that this
cannot be so, and that the principles of the common law are
operative upon all interstate commercial transactions except so
far as they are modified by congressional enactment."
This decision was rendered less than eight years before that in
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee Mills, where likewise was
presented for consideration the action of a State court in granting
relief on account of discrimination in commerce within the scope
of the commerce clause, that is to say, with reference to the
delivery of cars used in such commerce. If the point involved
was not settled in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co.,
it would seem to have been highly appropriate to consider the ef-
fect of that decision. But, so far as appears from the report, it
was considered by neither court nor counsel. Instead of ap-
plying the clearly defined rule that "the principles of the common
law are operative upon all interstate commercial transactions," etc.,
the court harked back to the well-established, though as it seems
5 x81 U. S., 92 (1901).
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to me, the here irrelevant distinction between "matters national"
and "matters of local interest," the latter, but not the former, be-
ing subject to regulation under' State authority in the absence of
regulation by Congress." The court, having declared the case
not to "rest upon any distinction between interstate commerce
and that wholly within the State," said:
"The authority of the State in merely incidental matters re-
mains undisturbed." And there was repudiated the suggestion
that "the control of Congress over interstate commerce and a
delegation of that control to a commission necessarily withdraws
from the State all power in respect to regulations of a local char-
dcter." It being added: "Until specific action by Congress or
the commission the control of the State over these incidental
matters remains undisturbed." Nevertheless it was also recog-
nized that common law instead of statutory rules were appli-
cable, it being said: "Here is presented . . . the question
of the power of the State to prevent discrimination between
shippers and the common law duty resting upon a carrier was
enforced. This common law duty, the State, in a case like the
present, may, at least in the absence of Congressional action,
compel a carrier to discharge."
It is proper to add, however, that the court seems to have
reached the same ultimate conclusion as if the rule established
in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cal Publishing Co. had been recog-
nized as applicable. But, however it may be as to the majority
opinion, the error that I have pointed out seems clearly manifest
in the dissenting opinion that expressed the views of two, if not
three members of the court. For such dissent was expressly
based on the ground that "the judgment of the court below
directly regulated interstate commerce." As we have seen, such
judgment was by way of enforcement of a "common law duty,"
but the writer of the dissenting opinion was, so far as appears
therefrom, unconscious of any distinction between regulation
under the authority of a State statute and regulation by virtue
of application of a common law rule.
This distinction seems also to have been overlooked by the
court in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes,7 where, in giving
6 This distinction, annunciated in Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How.,
299, 319 (Dec. 7, I85I), has been frequently reiterated by the Supreme
Court. See for instance, Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S., 622, 630 (885).
7 19 U. S., 477 (1903).
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effect to the common law rule recognized in a State court (though
contrary to that recognized in the Federal courts), denying the
right of a carrier to limit its liability for negligence, there was
applied as "virtually decisive," Chicago, Mikwaukee & St. Paul
Ry. Co. v. Solar.' But that was a case of giving effect to a State
statute denying such right of a carrier. On this point the court
(in Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes) said: "We can see no
difference in the application of the principle, based upon the
manner in which the State requires this degree of care and re-
sponsibility, whether enacted into a statute or resulting from the
rules of law enforced in the State courts." In view of what I
have already said, it scarcely needs adding that, in the view here-
in taken, it was the rule declared in Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Call Publishing Co., that should have been applied instead of
that in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solar.
Frederick H. Cooke.
8 169 N. Y., 133 (1898).
